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Abstract
This paper introduces and describes new protocols for proving knowledge
of secrets without giving them away: if the verifier does not know the secret,
he does not learn it [1]. An implementation van be found in this volume [2].
1 Introduction: Proving Secrets
In application domains where sensitive information plays an important role, such
as police research, intelligence, finance and the medical domain, one may want
to ask whether someone knows a specific fact. Because of the sensitivity of the
information concerned, it is often undesirable for the specific fact itself to be told
by way of posing the question. For example posing the question “Did you know
that Geertje is pregnant?” will inform the asked person about a fact. If it is the
aim to ask this very question without informing the asked person about the fact,
we need dedicated protocols for asking such questions in a multi-agent context.
In these protocols, we recognise a prover and a verifier. Three role configu-
rations exist for this type of protocols: (1) the prover may want to pro-actively
prove knowledge of a secret, (2) a verifier may ask someone to prove knowledge of
a secret, or (3) two players may mutually prove knowledge of a secret.
In essence, these protocols consist of the verifier asking the prover to modify
the secret in a way chosen by the verifier, and to show the cryptographic hash
value of this “altered secret”. The number of computations needed for this can be
reduced if we allow encrypted communication between the prover and the verifier.
The three role configurations together with the decision whether to use encryp-
tion, gives a total of six protocols, all shown in the extended paper [1].
2 Problem description
The following is a more precise description of when this type of protocols is needed.
Victor is a secret agent, and keeping secret his intelligence has a high priority.
However, his mission is to protect Peggy from great dangers, so when needed,
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protecting Peggy takes priority over keeping his information secret. Now he is
confronted with the following situation: Victor does not know whether certain
information known to him, is also known to Peggy. (“Peggy is kindly invited for
a dinner at Mallory’s place.”)1 Victor knows that Mallory is a very malicious
person. If Peggy does know that she is kindly invited, Victor would like to send
her a warning message (“Don’t go there, it is a trap. You will get killed in case you
go there.”). However, if Peggy has somehow not received the invitation, Victor
would like to keep his warning for himself, as well as his knowledge of Peggy’s
invitation. Therefore, Victor asks Peggy to prove her knowledge of the invitation.
Only after the proof, Victor will disclose his warning to Peggy.
Peggy is willing to prove her knowledge of the invitation, but only if she can
make sure Victor does not cheat on her, and actually finds out about the invitation
because he tricks her into telling him (she has been invited). That is, she only
wants to prove her knowledge of the invitation if Victor actually knew about the
invitation beforehand.
The protocols described in the long version of this article facilitate the described
situation. Both Victor and Peggy can initiate the protocol. Victor will not learn
any property of the secret my means of the protocol. In the protocol, Peggy does
not learn whether Victor actually knew about the invitation, other than from his
possible next actions, such as sending a warning.
3 The ANITA project
The research contributing to the protocols and this demonstation is the Adminis-
trative and Normative Information-Transaction Agents project, ANITA for short.
Its aim is to use multi-agent systems to provide methods for both complete and
legitimate information exchange of sensitive information, such as in the Dutch
police domain. The Dutch police offers us a very interesting application area for
our protocols. Police investigation teams typically want to keep their files secret,
but do want to know whether other teams are investigating on the same persons
or locations. If indeed multiple teams are investigating on the same person, they
would better co-operate, or at least make sure they do not hinder one another.
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